Electronic payment systems based on anonymous coins have been invented as a digital equivalent for physical banknotes. However, von Solms and Naccache discovered that such anonymous coins are also very well suited to support criminals in blackmailing.
Introduction
Blind signature based anonymous payment systems [Cha83, CFN88, Bra93] have been invented for privacy protecting payments over the internet. However, it was discovered by von Solms and Naccache [vSN92] that total anonymity may be misused by blackmailers: The blackmailer can exploit the properties of the used blind signature to receive blackmailed money from his victim so that neither the victim nor the bank are able to recognize the blackmailed coins later. Furthermore, the blackmailed coins can be transferred anonymously via an unobservable broadcast channel (e.g. a newsgroup). This attack is called the "perfect crime", as it is impossible to identify or trace the blackmailer.
To solve anonymity related problems as blackmailing, money laundering, or illegal purchases, payment systems with revokable anonymity [CMP95, CMS96, JY96, FTY96, DFTY97] have been proposed. In these payment systems trusted third parties are able to revoke the anonymity of the users at any time.
In our opinion blackmailing is the most serious drawback of the known payment systems offering total anonymity. Attacks like money laundering and illegal purchases aren't a major problem in anonymous electronic payment systems, as these problems are even worse with physical cash [Fro96] , because in anonymous electronic payment systems the bank always knows how much a customer withdraws and how much a person deposits. Thus the bank is able to detect either the initiator or the recipient of a suspicious transaction.
In this paper we will show how to fight blackmailing without restricting the anonymity of users, as it is done in systems with revokable anonymity. We present a new online payment scheme, which offers unconditional anonymity, but does not suffer from the blackmailing attack described above. In our opinion, it is not a drawback that our system is an online system, as the current trend in banking aims to minimize the risk of fraud and losses [Jak99] that may be caused by e.g. overspending.
We stress that our proposed payment system is very practical as no trusted third parties are needed, and it is especially well suited for payments over the internet and for mobile payments using cellular phones.
The remainder is structured as follows: A new technique, which we call marking, is introduced in the next section. In Section 3 we show how marking is used in several blackmailing scenarios to fight blackmailing. The implementation of a payment system using the marking technique is presented in section 4. Furthermore we sketch several improvements for the payment system in section 5, and we discuss how our approach relates to systems with revokable anonymity in section 6. Finally we conclude the paper with some open issues for further research.
Marking: A New Approach Against Blackmailing
Physical cash, particularly banknotes, have two important features, which can be used to fight blackmailing:
The serial numbers of the banknotes can be annotated.
The banknotes can be marked (e.g. with a special color).
The goal of both approaches is to support the investigation of blackmailings by enabling recognition of blackmailed banknotes after they are spent or discovered somewhere. As precondition for this method of investigation the victim of a blackmailing has to inform the bank and the police about the blackmailing before delivering the money.
No electronic payment system with a similar mechanism has been proposed yet. As annotating serial numbers of electronic coins violates anonymity, we base our approach for an anonymous payment system on the idea of marking coins.
Marking of Electronic Coins
Our anonymous payment system implements a reliable marking mechanism for electronic coins and has the following properties:
For every blackmailing the bank may issue coins with a different marking.
Only the bank can determine whether a coin is marked or not. For every other person a marked coin is indistinguishable from unmarked coins.
At withdrawal the bank has to prove that a coin is unmarked. This proof cannot be used to convince anybody except the owner of the bank account.
¯At deposit the bank can accept or reject marked coins, depending on the choice of the blackmailed person.
It follows directly that the anonymity of a customer is unconditionally protected, as he always detects unsolicited marking. In case of blackmailing, a customer may request marked coins from the bank, and every spending of marked coins will immediately be noticed by the bank.
Compared to physical cash, our marking mechanism has several advantages:
All unspent marked coins can be invalidated and refunded to the customer, after he instructs the bank to reject all marked coins. Thus, the customer looses only the amount of the already spent marked coins.
All spent marked coins can efficiently be detected at deposit. This enables tracing of the blackmailer.
Marking cannot be misused to trace honest users.
A New Payment System Based on Undeniable Signatures
The typical approach for unconditional anonymous payment systems is based on blind signatures [Cha83] . However, in these systems it is hard to embed a mark in a coin, because the bank would have to generate a modified signature at the withdrawal, and as the validity of a coin's signature is publicly verifiable, such modifications of a blind signature are easy to detect. Due to this shortcomings our aim is to restrict the verifiability of coins. We suggest the use of blind undeniable signatures [CvA89, Cha90] instead of blind signatures so that the verification of a signature can only be done by interacting with the bank in non-transferable zero-knowledge protocols:
Confirmation protocol: This protocol is used by the signer to prove the validity of an undeniable signature to another party.
Disavowal protocol:
This protocol is used by the signer to prove the invalidity of an undeniable signature to another party.
The main idea of our payment system is that the bank issues coins consisting of undeniable signatures. This has the following consequences:
At withdrawal, the bank must prove validity of a blindly withdrawn coin with a confirmation protocol. Without the confirmation protocol the bank may issue invalid or marked coins.
At deposit, if the bank rejects a coin, it must prove the invalidity of this coin with a disavowal protocol. For an accepted coin the bank never proves the validity. Therefore, the bank may accept detected marked coins, but cannot deny a valid coin.
It is not a drawback in an online payment system that a coin cannot be verified without the issuing bank, because due to possible overspendings the validity of coins can only be checked by the bank.
Implementing Marking in Our Payment System
The bank can issue marked coins by using a different private key (we will also call this a marking key) instead of the normal private key to generate the undeniable signature.
When the bank receives a coin, which was not generated with the normal private key, the bank has to check whether the coin has been created with a marking key. Basically, we have to distinguish three different types of coins:
Valid coins: These coins are created with the normal private key of the bank. The bank always proves the validity of this type of coins with the confirmation protocol at withdrawal.
Marked coins:
These coins are only issued in case of blackmailing and are created with a different marking key for each blackmailing. The confirmation protocol always fails for marked coins.
Invalid coins: These coins were neither generated with the normal private key nor with any of the marking keys. In other words, they were not generated by the bank. At deposit those coins are always rejected by the bank, which proves the invalidity with the disavowal protocol.
Some problems arise with these three types of coins, as a blackmailer must not be able to distinguish between marked and valid coins. The obvious way to test a coin to be valid, is to execute the confirmation protocol. Thus, we restrict the use of the confirmation protocol only to the withdrawal and we guarantee that for a specific coin the confirmation protocol is executed exactly once.
In the next section we will show how the customer and the bank together can cheat a blackmailer in the confirmation protocol to accept marked coins as valid coins.
Cheating a Blackmailer to Accept Marked Coins
A blackmailer must be prevented from using the confirmation protocol, as this protocol proves, whether a coin is valid or marked/invalid. However, the confirmation protocol is necessary to protect the customer from a cheating bank. In this section we show how to solve this problem.
Depending on the power of the blackmailer, we have to distinguish three scenarios:
Perfect crime: The blackmailer may threaten the victim to withdraw coins. However, the blackmailer has no physical control over the victim. To hide his identity, the blackmailer uses anonymous communication channels (e.g. remailer, broadcast communication or anonymous communication endpoints).
Impersonation: In addition to the perfect crime scenario the blackmailer may even force the victim to reveal any private information. While withdrawing coins this information can be used by the blackmailer to pretend to be the victim. Thus the blackmailer can withdraw an arbitrary number of coins without the help of the victim.
Kidnapping: In addition to the impersonation scenario the blackmailer has physical control over the blackmailed victim and thus the actions of the victim are observed by the blackmailer. However, this attack is not "perfect", as the blackmailer may be identified by the victim.
Next, we describe our countermeasures when blackmailing occurs. In case the customer is kidnapped, we sketch a solution using secure hardware. In the two other cases, we show that a software-only solution is sufficient.
Perfect Crime
In this scenario, the blackmailer has no physical control over the blackmailed person. Therefore, we suggest to take advantage of the zero-knowledge property of the confirmation protocol in order to convince the blackmailer even of the validity of marked coins.
In the following we describe our generic confirmation protocol (see figure 1 ) and assume that the bank will not execute any other confirmation protocol:
1. The customer generates a challenge from the coin and secretly chosen parameters. These parameters are encrypted with his own public key and send together with the challenge to the bank.
2. For the given challenge the bank commits to a zero-knowledge proof for the validity of the coin and sends the committed proof to the customer.
3. The customer has to reveal his secret parameters to the bank. Then the bank checks, if the customer's challenge was built correctly with the previously withdrawn coin and the committed values from step 1.
4. Only then the bank opens the committed proof, which convinces the customer of the validity of the withdrawn coin. Now assume that the customer gets blackmailed and that the customer instructs the bank to issue marked coins. After receiving the coins, the blackmailer can choose the secret parameters for the confirmation protocol and thus the challenge for the bank and the encryption of the parameters. Then the blackmailer instructs the customer to execute the confirmation protocol with these values. But as the customer can decrypt the secret parameters, he can always generate the answer that the blackmailer expects for an unmarked coin. Because the blackmailer cannot distinguish between the simulated and a real transcript of the confirmation protocol, he will accept the proof even for a marked coin.
Impersonation
If the blackmailer impersonates the customer and withdraws the coins without the help of the customer, the customer has to inform the bank to issue marked coins. Furthermore, the customer has to give his decryption key to the bank, so that it can cheat the blackmailer as described in the scenario above. Note that transferring the decryption key to the bank will only enable the bank to mark coins in the future. Previously withdrawn coins are not affected and the privacy of the customer remains untouched. Alternatively, the customer can decrypt the parameters for the bank and keep his decryption key secret.
In principle this scenario leads to the same solution as in the perfect crime scenario.
Kidnapping the Customer
Without physical contact between the blackmailer and the blackmailed person marking works fine. But it may happen that the blackmailed person is also the kidnapped person. In this case, the kidnapped person may be controlled, such that he is neither able to instruct the bank to issue marked coins nor to generate a faked confirmation protocol.
The solution to this problem is a distress cash [DFTY97] system with secure hardware (e.g. a smartcard). The customer can only withdraw coins and execute the confirmation protocol by using his secure hardware, so that it is impossible to influence the execution of the protocols. The main idea is that the hardware offers two different authentication mechanisms (e.g. two different PINs), which can be used to indicate a blackmailing. The first mechanism should be used for ordinary withdrawals and the second is for blackmailings only. In the latter case the secure hardware can inform the bank about the blackmailing, so that the bank issues marked coins. Due to the use of secure hardware, communication with the bank is encrypted and can be assumed to be unobservable. This means that it is impossible for the blackmailer to detect that his victim used the authentication mechanism for marked coins.
Implementation of Our Payment System
In the following we will assume an attacker trying to commit the perfect crime, as the solution for this scenario can easily be transferred to the impersonation and the kidnapping scenario.
For the implementation of our payment system there are still some problems, which we will solve:
Comparing: A blackmailer can withdraw some coins in a regular withdrawal and the same coins in a blackmailing. For the regular withdrawal he knows that the coins are valid. If the blackmailed coins are marked, he will determine a difference between the blackmailed coins and the regularly withdrawn coins.
Transforming: A blackmailer must not be able to destroy marking. It cannot be assumed that a blackmailer follows the withdrawal protocol (e.g. he may use a different kind of blinding), but it must be guaranteed that marked coins cannot be transformed to invalid coins, while valid coins remain valid.
The Main Idea of Our Construction
To prevent the comparing attack we have to ensure that withdrawing the same coin two or more times always results in different signatures. This can be achieved with a randomized signature scheme. We developed a new construction for a randomized undeniable signature, which uses the Okamoto-Schnorr blind signature scheme [Oka92, PS96] combined with the Chaum-van Antwerpen undeniable signature scheme [CvA89] . The main idea is to sign a random value with an undeniable signature, where the random value is a part of the blind signature.
System Setup
In our payment system the system parameters are prime numbers Ô and Õ with Õ ´Ô ½µ and elements ½ , ¾ and ¿ of´ Ô µ £ of order Õ. 
The Withdrawal Protocol
The withdrawal protocol is shown in figure 2. For every new coin the bank creates a new random generator « Ö ¾ ÑÓ Ô and sends this value to the customer. Then the Finally the bank issues an undeniable signature Û « Ü ÑÓ Ô as a certificate for «. Again, the certificate has to be transformed to Û ¼ Û AE « ¼ Ü ÑÓ Ô by the customer to circumvent recognition by the bank and to be a valid undeniable signature for « ¼ . Note that for this transformation we have to omit the hashfunction on «. The impact on the security will be discussed in section 4.6.
At the end of the withdrawal protocol the customer possesses a valid coin (Ñ
, and the validity of the undeniable signature Û has to be proven in a confirmation protocol. Our confirmation protocol (see figure 3 ) is a variant of the protocols described in [CvA89, Cha90] . If the customer follows the withdrawal protocol correctly, then the given proof is also valid for Û ¼ .
Marking Blackmailed Coins
In the case of blackmailing marked coins are issued using a different private key ËÃ Í Å Ü Å to generate the undeniable signature. In order to recognize marked coins the bank has to maintain lists of all used marking keys:
1. The list Å contains all marking keys for which the corresponding coins should be accepted.
2. The list Å Ê contains all marking keys for which the corresponding coins should be rejected. When the customer instructs the bank to reject all his marked coins, the bank moves the corresponding marking key to Å Ê and refunds the amount of all unspent marked coins to the customer.
Our confirmation protocol for the Chaum-van Antwerpen undeniable signature used in the case of blackmailing is show in figure 4. As the customer is able to decrypt the committed secret parameters and , he can give the correct answer Ø « ¿ ÑÓ Ô, which the blackmailer expects for an unmarked coin.
Spending and Depositing Coins
When a customer spends a coin ( Checking the marking keys: The bank checks the marking keys Ü Å ¾ Å Å Ê by testing Û ¼ « ¼Ü Å ÑÓ Ô. If one of the marking keys fulfills this equation, the bank knows to which blackmailing this coin belongs and whether it has to accept or reject this coin. If the test fails for all marking keys, the coin is invalid and will be rejected.
Disavowal protocol:
If the bank rejects a coin because of the undeniable signature, it has to prove that the undeniable signature was not generated with Ü. In our payment system we use Chaum's disavowal protocol [Cha90] for this proof.
Unforgability of Coins and Undetectability of Marking
It is sufficient to show that the blind signature is unforgeable, as this implies the unforgability of coins. Obviously, the security of the blind signature is not affected even if marking keys are published. Our Okamoto-Schnorr blind signature differs from the original blind signature ¼ was computed and thus the verification equation can only be fulfilled, if an attacker knows the discrete logarithm of to the base of ½ or ¾ . As no undeniable signature of ½ or ¾ is available to an attacker, no suitable can be constructed. Thus always has to be ½, which means that blackmailers cannot apply this attack to destroy marking.
Improvements and Enhancements
After we described the basic version of our payment system, we now sketch several ideas how the system can be further improved.
The efficiency of the withdrawal can be improved, if the bank uses the same random « and the same certificate Û for all coins of a withdrawal session. This improvement has no impact on the linkability of the coins from one session, as long as the customer uses a different AE for every coin.
As long as no marked coins are issued by the bank, the bank only needs to verify the blind signature. If this signature is correct, then it must have been issued by the bank, and thus the coin can be accepted without checking the undeniable signature.
¯If the bank detects a coin generated with a marking key Ü Å ¾ Å Ê at deposit, the bank may simply publish the key Ü Å instead of interacting in a disavowal protocol.
When a blackmailer has been caught, the marking key used for this blackmailing can be removed from Å or Å Ê . If a coin with such a marking is deposited later, it is always rejected as invalid.
A Comparison to Systems with Revocable Anonymity
In this section we compare our payment system to systems with revocable anonymity (e.g. [DFTY97, JY96, CMS96]), which are another well known solution for blackmailing attacks.
First of all we'd like to mention that most arguments against key escrow [AAB · 98] (e.g. risk, complexity, costs) also apply for revocable anonymity. However, an advantage of a system with revocable anonymity is that tracing is possible at any time after the withdrawal. This makes it always possible to trace blackmailed coins. In our system the customer has to decide at withdrawal, whether the coins should be traceable or not.
An advantage of our solution is its unconditional anonymity, while in revocable anonymity systems the anonymity depends on the integrity of the trusted third party: The customer has particularly no possibility to detect illegal tracing. Moreover it is hard to prove that illegal tracing happened.
In contrast to systems with revocable anonymity our approach doesn't rely on a trusted third party. In general a trusted third party causes additional costs, which the customer may not be willing to pay for. As the trusted third party manages sensitive personal data, it has to be protected carefully. However, the more secure the trusted third party is, the more expensive is the service of the trusted third party.
Conclusions
We have sketched a novel blackmailing resistant, unconditional anonymous payment system without the need for any trusted third party. Our payment system protects private users against blackmailing attacks, by offering a marking mechanism similar to the well known marking of banknotes. Our marking mechanism is even more effective, because every transaction with a marked coin is immediately recognized by the bank. At deposit a detected marked coin may be accepted or rejected, depending on the choice of the customer.
As coins may only be marked in agreement with the customer, the bank cannot misuse marking to degrade anonymity. Nevertheless marked coins are undetectable for a blackmailer. This enables tracing of blackmailers and allows revocation of marked coins, without sacrificing anonymity.
An open question about our system is how it can be extended to other blackmailing scenarios (e.g. when the bank is blackmailed). Another question is whether it is possible to find a solution for the kidnapping scenario that does not rely on secure hardware.
